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Introduction
The existence of the Denning Law Journal testifies to Lord Denning's unique
importance in re-shaping English law to meet the challenges of the middle
decades of the twentieth century. The massive corpus of his collected judgments
has been subjected to a detailed and rigorous scholarly scrutiny of a kind not
accorded to any other English judge of recent times, and his contribution to
constitutional and administrative law in particular, has been analysed searchingly
and, in some cases, highly critically. 1 In adition, he has, of course, given us his own
retrospective views on many of his most significant judgments in sundry lectures
and articles and in the series of volumes beginning with The Discipline of Law
(1979) and extending to The Closing Chapter (1983).2
In all this literature, one minor but interesting part of his judicial career has
received little attention. From January 1946 to October 1948, Denning], then a
puisne judge in the King's Bench Division, was the judge nominated to hear
appeals from the tribunals set up under the Pensions Appeal Tribunals Act 19433
in succession to Tucker J. It was his first foray into administrative law and gave
him an unusual opportunity to develop and implement his views. The statute made
no provision for a further appeal so he was constrained only by the need to respect
the decisions of the nominated judges in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
In The Family Story,4 Denning recounts his relish for this taste of unfettered
judicial creativity, which he used to good effect; for by the time he was elevated to
the Court of Appeal, in October 1948, he had created a framework of controls and
guidelines which left his successor with little scope to do more than alter emphases
"Of the Department of Law, Brunel University. I wish to thank my colleagues Mr Martin Coleman
and Dr K. J. M. Smith for their helpful comments.
1. P. Robson and P. Watchman (eds.),Justice, Lord De1l1/ingand the Constitution (1981); J. L. Jowell
and J. P. W. B. McAuslan (eds.),Lord DfIlning: The Judge and lhe Law (1984).
2. There is a full list of his writings to 1984 in Lord DfIlnillg: The Judge mid the Law, supra n.1.
3. For an outline of Denning's career, see R. F. V. Heuston, in Lord De1l1ling:The Judge and lhe Law,
supra n.1, pp.1-25.
4. (1985), p.165. Denning's predecessor, Tucker, regretted that there was no further appeal: Kemp v.
Min;sler of PfIls;ons (1945-6) 61 T.L.R. 341, at p.343.
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and refine procedures. Only one of his decisions, Robertson v.Ministry of Pensions, 5
has proved to be of sufficient general importance to find its way into the textbooks,
but of the earlier decision in Starr, Nuttall and Bourne v. Ministry of Pensions6
Professor Palley has written: "Many men would think his courageous and humane
decision in Starr, affecting the welfare of many thousands of ex-servicemen and
their families, was a worthwhile achievement of a lifetime".7 It is the purpose of
this article to examine in more detail the reported decisions under the Act and to
elucidate Denning's ideas on the proper functioning of administrative tribunals
and the role of the judiciary in supervising them. First, however, it is necessary to
sketch in the background to the legislation.
The background
Pensions to ex-servicemen and their families for death or disability sustained
during service in the armed forces were granted under the terms of successive
Royal Warrants. The unprecedented scale of the casualties in the Great War, and
their being no longer confined to professional fighting men, made the
administration of the Warrant a matter of much greater public concern than
before. Dissatisfaction with the many decisions of the Ministry of Pensions adverse
to claimants was voiced in and out of Parliament and eventually the government
had to respond by establishing independent appeal tribunals.9 The Lord
Chancellor was made responsible for manning the tribunals, each of which
comprised a legally qualified chairman, a doctor and a disabled ex-serviceman.
Although they allowed more than 20% of appeals from the Minister's decisions,
the tribunals themselves came under fire, but heavypressure to introduce a further
appeal to a "supreme tribunal" was successfully resisted by the Lord Chancellor's
Office.10
When war again threatened it was apparent to those charged with contingency
planning that some similar pensions provision for civilian casualties would be
needed. This raised the spectre of a continuing post-war charge on government
revenue of wholly unpredictable but potentially enormous dimensions, and a
5. [1949] 1 K.B. 227. The importance of the decision in public law is its extension of estoppel by
representation to public authorities. See S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review ofAdminslralive Action 3rd ed.,
(1973), p.4 n.4 for speculation on Denning's own estimate of its importance.
6. [1946] 1 K.B. 345.
7. Lord Drnning: The Judge and the Law, S/lpra n.l, p.365 n.78.
8. Comparatively few decisions were reported in the general series of reports, but the semi-official
War Pension Appeals Reports contain more than 300 of Denning's, as well as a handful by Tucker ],
almost fifty from Scotland and two from Northern Ireland.
9. War Pensions (Administrative Provisions) Act 1919. Separate appeal tribunals to determine the
assessment of the pension payable were introduced by the War Pensions Act 1921 and on these a
second doctor sat instead of the lawyer. In 1940 nearly 850,000 Great War Pensions were still being
paid.
10. Pari. Debs. 1922 (5th series) H. ofC., vo1.l51, cols.320-42, 1615-39; PRO LCO 2/971. See also
Sir Claud Schuster's summary in PRO LCO 2/938: Memorandum for Lord Haldane, 26.1.1924,
!T.42-5.About 40 cases in which the tribunals were thought to have erred were dealt with under an
unpublicised "arrangement" between the Ministry of Pensions and the Treasury.
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desire to restrict the number of war pensions payable until the total number of
potential claims had become clearer may have influenced the government's
decision to defer the establishment of both entitlement and assessment tribunals
until the war had ended. I I Meanwhile, according to the Minister of Pensions,
"The finest court of appeal in the country is available in the House of
Commons.,,12
This position, though endorsed by the cabinet as late as March 1942,13 was
becoming politically untenable; more than 100,000 claims had been rejected and
Aneurin Bevan had complained that the Commons order paper was becoming
congested by members' attempts to bring individual cases of alleged injustice
before the House. I 4 The ploy of appointing as Minister of Pensions a popular
figure, Sir Walter Womersley (described in one debate as "a sort of bluff King
Hal"),15 giving him as Parliamentary Under Secretaries Labour MPs with a
reputation for championing the working man (successively Miss Ellen Wilkinson
and Will Paling), and setting up an advisory committee which included some of the
most vocal critics, appeased the sceptics for a while but they could only repeat the
threadbare excuse that too few suitable doctors were available for the tribunals. A
rising tide of backbench anger, both over the restrictive entitlement to pensions
and the lack of any appeal, finally forced the government's hand after a particularly
stormy debate on 23rd March 1943.16 A new, more liberal Royal Warrant and
appeal tribunals were promised.
The Pensions Appeal Tribunals Bill, modelled on the earlier legislation, had its
second reading on 24th June. But the Commons by now were deeply suspicious:
details of the new Warrant had not been released and at the Committee stage a
backbench revolt obliged the government to withdraw its Bill. 17 When it returned
nearly three weeks later, after the terms of the Warrant had been disclosed, it
contained major concessions on the burden of proof and the strength of the causal
link between service and disability and also provided for an appeal from the
tribunals on a point of law. 18Given the Bill's troubled history and hasty revision, it
is not surprising that those involved in the creation of the tribunals failed to
appreciate the significance of the changes in the Warrant and the Bil1.19 Tribunal
sittings began in October 1943, and more than twenty tribunals were soon in
operation.
11. Pari. Debs. 1939-40 (5th series) H. of e., Yo1.360,co1.899.
12. Ibid., co1.705.
13. PRO LCO 2/2646.
14. Pari. Debs. 1940-1 (5th series) H. of e., yol. 370, col. 280. The Ministry always refused to make
public the number of claims on the grounds of national security.
15. Pari. Debs. 1941-2 (5th series) l-I. of e., yo1.383, co1.1896,per E. Walkden.
16. Pari. Debs. (5th series) H. of e., yols.367-390 shows this growing pressure.
17. Pari. Debs. 1942-3 (5th series) H. of e., Yo1.390,co]s.1333-1428, 1818-54.
18. Ibid., yo1.391,cols.716-864, 1114-1220. For the reconstruction of the Bill see PRO LCO 2/2780.
19. PRO LCO 2/3714: G. P. Coldstream to Sir A. Napier, 9 September 1947.
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In the debates government spokesmen had laid particular emphasis on the
informal procedures, which would make legal representation usually unnecessary,
and on the need to avoid the fate that had befallen the Workmen's Compensation
Acts.2oIn the first few months the government's hope that the points of law upon
which appeals were to be made to the nominated judge would be few seemed to be
borne out,21 but plainly, much would turn on the interpretation placed by the
nominated judge on the width of the right of appeal, since the more willing he was
to entertain appeals the greater would be his opportunity to control the tribunals.
The right of appeal
1. Procedural limitations
As well as being limited to points of law, the right of appeal was circumscribed in
two ways: first by a requirement that leave must be obtained from the tribunal or
the judge (section 6(2)) and second by a sixweeks time limit for appeals, imposed
by rule 23(2) of the Pensions Appeal Tribunals Rules 1943; by rule 31 this period
could be extended by the tribunal or the President of the Tribunals. The Great
War tribunals had consistently adopted a very rigid stance against allowing appeals
out of time, administrative measures having had to be taken to mitigate the
injustices that resulted.22 Their successors seemed disposed to follow suit and in
Richardson v.Minister of Pensions23 (May, 1945) the Court of Session held that the
President's decision was not reviewable by the court. Cooper LJ-C described the
six weeks time limit as "very liberal", especially since "if an appellant can adduce
some good reason for a relaxation of the time limit (as, for example, that the delay
has been due to illness or some accidental mischance affecting himself or his
advisers) the desired indulgence will doubtless be granted: and I should assume
would not be opposed by the Ministry at least in cases where the delay was
slight.,,24In particular, the court was not prepared to grant an extension merely on
the grounds that its own decision on one appeal cast doubts on the correctness of
other tribunal decisions in cases with broadly similar facts.25
This was the orthodox view, with which the Lord Chancellor and the
Attorney-General were in agreement: "what had occurred was a possibility
inherent in any system of law, and that if litigants did not exercise their right of
appeal and subsequently a litigant does exercise his right of appeal and succeeds,
the litigants in cases already decided cannot and should not have the opportunity
of re-opening their cases. If such a course were allowed, the practical difficulties
20. Pari. Debs. 1942-3 (5th series) H. of c., vo1.390, cols.1326, 1355-6; vo1.391,cols.1205-9.
21. In the notes issued for the guidance of appellants the appeals were optimistically referred to as
"rare cases"_
22. PRO LeO 2/974, 978.
23. [1945] S.c. 363.
24. Ibid., at p.368.
25. The Minister of Pensions had expressed a more liberal view:Pari. Debs. 1944-5 (5th series) H. of
c., vo1.360, cols.2239-40.
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would be insuperable."26 But Denning's decision in Starr, Nuttall and Bourne v.
Minister of Pensions27 meant that as many as 27,000 tribunal decisions were
probably vitiated by procedural defects. Because of the importance attached to
maintaining the principle of finality in litigation and also because it was felt to be
unfair to allow those claimants to appeal out of time and probably succeed on a
technicality while later claimants with comparable case histories would fail on the
merits of their applications, the government declined to take any action. This
decision gave rise to a storm of protest in the press and in Parliament.28 The
Minister's Central Advisory Committee was strongly critical and servicemen's
organisations were predictably up in arms: the British Legion representative on the
CAC "could not believe that the Government or the country would wish to stand
on a legal position which deterred ex-servicemen from receiving pensions because
their appeals happened to have been heard before certain legal pronouncements
on the interpretation of the Royal Warrant had been made.,,29
Neither did the Legion confine itself to political activity, for it prepared a "mass
attack" by placing seventy-three representative applications for leave to appeal out
of time in Denning's list.3o By unexpectedly setting these applications down for
July 11th, Denning denied the government any breathing space and seems also to
have made it clear that he could not be relied upon to followRichardson.31 So to
head off the "disaster" that an adverse decision threatened, the government had to
come to terms with the British Legion, the applications being adjourned while a
compromise was negotiated.32The terms ofthe bargain were that all of these cases
would be reviewed by the Ministry and claimants who were again rejected might
take their case to a "Special ReviewTribunal", constituted like an appeal tribunal,
but with members of the highest calibre that could be procured. Although both
sides might bring fresh evidence as it would be a hearing de novo, there would be
no appeal from the SRT's decision.33 Here, then, the mere threat of a Denning
judgment sufficed to wring a significant concession from the government. As
Denning remarked in a later case, "this reserve power has often proved a decisive
force in obtaining for servicemen their rights.,,34
Nevertheless, Denning knew the goverment's manoeuvre was designed to
prevent him from delivering a highly inconvenient ruling and when he held, in
Brain and Wilkes v. Minister of Pensions,35 that a tribunal erred in law when it
decided against the claimant only by a majority, and thereby re-created the
26. PRO LCO 2/3711: nOle of meeting, May 1946.
27. [1946] 1 K.B. 345.
28. See especially Pari. Debs. 1945-6 (5th series) H. of c., vo1.422, cols.1633-44.
29. PRO LCO 2/3711: W. Paling to Lord Chancellor, 16 July 1946.
30. PRO LCO 2/3711: Daily Mirror, 12June 1946.
31. [1945] S.c. 363.
32. Supra, n.29.
33. This was announced in the Commons on 25 July: Pari. Debs. 1945-6 (5th series) H. ofC., vo1.426,
co1.2023. It was estimated that about 5,000 cases might go before the SRTs.
34. James v.Millisler oj PeIlsiOIlS [1947] 1 K.B. 867, at p.871.
35. [1947] 1 K.B. 625.
101
THE DENNING LAWJOURNAL
situation brought about byMoxon and Starr (albeit on a much smaller scale - some
eighty cases), the matter was taken to the Social Services Committee of the
Cabinet, which accepted the Lord Chancellor's view that no concession to popular
opinion should be made. The Attorney-General duly repeated the orthodox view
of the law, yet a few months later he was forced to admit that this view was
mistaken. Mrs James's husband had died of Hodgkin's Disease and in September,
1946 a tribunal had pronounced it not attributable to his war service. In
November, a differently constituted tribunal held, in Donovan v. Ministry of
Pensions,37 that a Hodgkin's Disease case was attributable to war service. Mrs
James was refused leave to appeal out of time and applied to the judge.38 For the
Ministry, the Attorney-General and Harold Parker QC argued that the Scottish
cases of Richardson and Whit?9 should be followed, that RSC order 55 r2(1)4O
governing applications for leave to appeal out of time in the King's Bench, was
prohibitive and precluded this application, and that the question at issue in the
case was one of fact not law.
Denning rejected each of the arguments, holding the RSC on this question to
be directory, not prohibitive; it was not ousted by the Pensions Appeal Tribunals
Act and the rules made under that Act did not bind the judge,41so that he had the
power to grant the application in an appropriate case. Since the Court of Session's
expectation that the President would grant leave whenever it was just to do so had
been falsified by experience, especially by the refusals which had obliged the
government to establish the SRT's, then this was such a case.42 This was
disingenuous, for Cooper LJ-C had made it abundantly clear that he did not
consider injustice would be done simply because an interpretation of the lawmore
favourable to the claimant was given after his own time for appealing had lapsed.43
For Denning, however, "the circumstances of pension appeals differ ... from
ordinary litigation. The serviceman usually appears in person, or is helped by a
British Legion representative. The Minister appears by one of his officers who is
not a lawyer ... The circumstances are altogether different from ordinary
litigation where it is the duty of the party, and not the court, to raise any point of
law on which he relies.,,44Moreover, "it is inevitable that in a field where the law
has had to be declared and developed so rapidly, there should be occasional
36. PRO LCO 2/3714: memorandum to Social Services Committee, June 1947 and minutes of
meeting 55[47] 4th meeting, 25 June.
37. 1 W.P.A.R. 609.
38. [1947] 1 K.B. 867. For the decision to employ the Attorney-General in this case see PRO LCO
2/3714: R.Rieu to Lord Chancellor, 3 July 1947.
39. [1945] S.c. 363; 2 W.P.A.R. 483.
40. "An appeal to the nominated judge for leave to appeal shall not be made unless an application has
been made to the tribunal and has been refused."
4\. [1947] I K.B. 867, at pp.869-70.
42. Ibid., at p.8n.
43. [1945] S.c. 363, at p.368.
44. Ibid., at p.873.
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errors." Accordingly, he proclaimed that "the doctrine of stare decisis does not
apply in its full rigour to this branch of the law.,,45
The second point, that in the absence of a hierarchy of appeals an erroneous
judgment can only be cured by legislation if it has to be followed to the letter, is the
stronger. The other seems plausible but becomes unconvincing when it is recalled
that the "point of law" in question is really the one about the sufficiency of
evidence which claimants regularly did take, and that the British Legion advisers
were in most cases at least as expert and alive to the possibility of an error oflaw of
this kind as the average lawyer in a county court or magistrates' court.
After James, the President of the PATs told the Lord Chancellor's Office that
he would automatically grant leave out of time where the request was based on the
impact of a later judgment.46 However, Denning had still not finished widening his
net, and now had the "unappealable" SRT's in his sights. Mrs Gillibrand's claim
had been rejected by a tribunal back in September, 1944, and was again turned
down by the Ministry on review, but this widow refused to take it to an SRT;
instead, following James,47 she sought leave to appeal out of time against the
original decision and found Denning predictably sympathetic.48 He agreed that
her case should be remitted to a PAT for "from any decision of that Tribunal Mrs
Gillibrand will have a right of recourse to this Court. She shall not be forced to go
before a tribunal from which there is no appeal. I am glad to have the assurances of
the Ministry that there will be no delay. She has waited for justice long enough.,,49
The tone of this pronouncement, familiar to connoisseurs of the later Denning
style, is somewhat at odds with the circumstances of the case, but it is clear that the
exclusion of appeals from the SRT's rankled with him. 50
He soon received an unexpected opportunity to bring even the SR Ts under his
control. The Legion had kept its part of the bargain, but a Mr Revely, advised by
the R.A.F. Association, disregarded the understanding and, having been turned
down by the Ministry (twice), by a PAT (in June, 1944) and by an SRT, applied
out of time for leave to appeal against the original PAT decision.51 Using his own
decisions in James and Gillibrand,52 Denning explained that a "pre-Moxon,,53
45. Ibid., at p.872.
46. PRO LCO 2/3714: G. P. Coldstream to Sir A. Napier, 9 September 1947.
47. [1947] I K.B. 867.
48. [1947] W.N. 320; I W.P.A.R. 1039.
49. I W.P.A.R. 1039, at p.1054.
50. It is evident from the tributes which Denning and counsel for the British Legion paid to the SRTs
that it was not the actual quality of their decisions which concerned him: Reve/y v.M il/isler of PePlsiOliS3
W.P.A.R. 1573, at pp.1581, 1583.
51. 3 W.P.A.R. 1573. The Reve/y case is complicated. His original appeal was allowed as to aggravation
only and he did not appeal, but when his pension was stopped on a finding that the aggravation had
passed away,he appealed against that decision. He was able to go to a SRT on the original decision, but
could not now appeal against it to the judge (Woodrow v. Mil/isler of PePlsiOllS I W.P.A.R. 659).
52. [1947] 1 K.B. 867; I W.P.A.R. 1039.
53. [1945] I K.B. 490.
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claimant now had two choices and that "continuance of this dual system is very
undesirable".54 afthe three reasons he gave the important one was plainly that the
SRTs might decide points of law incorrectly and uncorrectably. He therefore
seized the opportunity to work out with counsel for the various parties a rather
complicated procedure whereby he would effectively (though not in form) create
an appeal against the decision of an SRT.55
George Coldstream summarised the effects as follows: "We have now arrived at
this situation: there is a statutory right of appeal to the nominated Judge of the
High Court from a decision of the statutory tribunals and it seems that Denning J
will allow it to be exercised no matter what the date of the decision may have been
and notwithstanding that the claimant has availed himself of the machinery of the
SRTs. The very existence of the SRTs is based on the supposition that in cases
rejected by the statutory tribunals before 31.7.1946, it is impossible for the
claimant to get to the High Court. On this hypothesis, one of the main reasons for
setting up the SRT procedures, disappeared. As a matter of practical effect, the
new situation simply means that the claimant has a double review by the Minister
of Pensions and a double appeal to a PAT. ,,56
2. Law and facts
As for the restriction of the right of appeal to points of law, Lord Denning has
taken a prominent part in "the incessant conversion of questions of fact into
questions of law,,57 which has become such a feature of judicial practice. He
playfully alluded to this technique in a lecture in 197758as one of the means used
in policing administrative and quasi-judicial decision makers, but the boundary
between the two is in any case notoriously difficult to draw with precision. 59Some
questions clearly fell to be regarded as points of law; such were the definitions of
"war risk injury" and "war service injury" in the schemes for compensating
ciVilians,where there was a useful body of case law from workmen's compensation
to draw upon.60 But the floodgate which Denning flung wide, and through which
the British Legion channelled a torrent of appeals, was the requirement that the
tribunal should limit its deliberations to, and base its decision solely upon,
evidence which was logically probative.
54. 3 W.P.A.R. 1573, at p.1581.
55. Ibid., at pp.l582-84. The first such "appeal" Vlllsell v.Minister oJPensions) is reported at [1948] 2
All E.R. 789.
56. PRO LCO 2/3728: Coldstream to Attorney-General, 12 August 1948. The President of the
SRTs (Sir Henry Braund) declared that these decisions made them redundant, but after discussions,
they were continued and Denning's circuitous "appeal" procedure was simplified: PRO LCO 2/3712,
3715, 3716; Swal/ v.Mil/ister oj Pensio1lS4 W.P.A.R. 387.
57. A.W.B. Simpson in Lord Dem/irlg: TheJudge and the Law, supra n.l, at pASO. For a general account
see S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action 3rd ed. (1973), pp.III-20.
58. See Justice, Lord Dennil/g and the C01lStitutiOll,supra n.l, at p.163.
59. A point made by Denning when criticising a tribunal for not giving assistance to a claimant in
formulating her application for leave to appeal: Lee v.Minister of Pe1lSions(No.2) 3 W.P.A.R. 1901.
60. Examples are Ex p. Haines [1945] K.B. 183; Re Saffell [1946] I K.B. 259.
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This was the rule laid down by Tucker J in Moxon v.Minister of Pensions61 and
confirmed in Starr, Nuttall and Bourne v. Minister of Pensions62 and once the
Ministry amended its original practice, it was seldom that there was no medical
evidence at all against the claim. It was vainlyargued in Scottish cases that medical
questions were to be regarded purely as questions of fact and not susceptible to
appeal,63 and Denning soon gave notice that he was very willing to subject the
medical evidence to detailed examination. The implications were lost neither on
the government nor on the servicemen's organisations which assisted claimants.
Coldstream observed that "in his judgment in Starr and Nuttall ... Denning J laid
down as the test that the claim must be negatived by evidence . .. It seems,
however, at any rate in the learned Judge's view, to open up as a matter oflaw ...
the question whether there was any evidence at all. Rowing and Forster64 are
illustrations of this development. On this basis, every case might be appealable to
the High Court, and the limitation of appeals to points of lawwould cease to have
any meaning." He predicted that the "microscopic attention paid to the precise
words used by the doctor ... will inevitablymean slowing up of the machine" and
that there would be a "flood of appeals to the High Court".65 Both predictions
were fulfilled to some extent.
Some chairmen of tribunals, and especially the President (A. B. Ashby),
confronted with numerous notices of appeal couched in such general terms as
"there was not sufficient evidence on which the tribunal could have found against
. the claimant", sought to hinder appellants by requiring, in effect, "further and
better particulars" under rule 25 in order to prepare the statement of case for the
judge66 but Denning took a dim view of such practices, insisting that the
overriding terms of rule 11 should be given effect.67
With such encouragement the appeal in very general terms became
commonplace,68 although in cases where the Ministry had conceded, or the
tribunal found, "aggravation" but not "attributability", it was varied to a claim that
the evidence supporting one necessarily proved the other as well.69\¥hat kept the
number of appeals down was the practice of the British Legion in only promoting
those which seemed to have a reasonable chance of success, rather than the formal
restriction to questions of law.
61. [1945] I K.B. 490.
62. [1946] I K.B. 345.
63. Brown v.MinisterofPmsions [1946] S.c. 471; T. Broum v.Millister ofPmsiollS 2 W.P.A.R. 577; Paul
v.Minister of PmsiollS 2 W.P.A.R. 633.
64. [1946] I All E.R. 664; I W.P.A.R. 145.
65. PRO LeO 2/3711: memorandum of I May 1946.
66. Port v. Minister of PmsiOllS 3 W.P.A.R. 1491.
67. Lee v.Minister of Pensions (No.2) 3 W.P.A.R. 1901. "It shall be the duty of the Tribunal to assist
any Appellant who appears to them to be unable to make the best of his case" (r.II(3».
68. StockweJ/ v. Minister of Pensions I W.P.A.R. 189.
69. E.g., BOll, Baker and McDermoll v.Minister of Pet/siol/S 3 W.P.A.R. 2167.
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Denning's determin,ation to keep the route to the High Court open to all
claimants led him to demolish all obstacles, whether embodied formally in rules or
pleaded as administrative inconvenience.7o He was more than willing to pay the
price of a greatly increased workload, and showed none of the concern at the
proliferation of appeals that he later displayed to the detriment of other claimants
to state provision.71 Only one group of claimants failed to bring themselves within
his jurisdiction. In Gates v.Ministry of Pensions, 72 he rejected a widow's claim that it
extended to appeals from tribunal decisions under the Great War legislation.
Denning agreed that the body of the 1943 Act did not expressly confine it to the
later war, but the long title did and recent (unspecified) authorities showed that he
might use that as an aid to interpretation.
Denning's successor, Ormerod J, was even able to extend the scope of the
appeal a little further. In Stephens v.Ministry ofPensions,73 against unusually strong
opposition from counsel for the Ministry, he held that in an exceptional case he
might re-hear and grant an application for leave to appeal out of time which he had
previously refused. In doing so he was acting on a suggestion of Morton LJ in Ex p.
Aronsohn74 that this might be done where crucial new evidence had come to light.
The steady flow of appeals which these decisions encouraged enabled Denning to
impose on the tribunals his conception of their practice and procedure.
Settling the practice of tribunals
1. The dethronement of the medical member
In all his pension appeals, it is doubtful whether Denning gave a more important
judgment than he did on his very first day in Starr, Nuttall and Bourne v.Ministry of
Pensions.75 These were test cases arranged by the Ministry of Pensions in the hope
that the new judge could be persuaded to adopt a less inconvenient approach than
his predecessor, whose decision in Moxon v. Minister of Pension/6 had dismayed
and disconcerted those responsible for the operation of the tribunals.
Despite the significant changes made by the Royal Warrant and the revised Bill,
the tribunals, taking their lead from their President, conducted their proceedings
in much the same way as under the earlier legislation and warrants. The
informality stressed by ministers in Parliament was given recognition in their own
rules, which expressly empowered them to take notice of facts not admissible in a
70. In addition to those mentioned, see also Bell v.Minister of Pet/siom I W.P.A.R. 965, dealing with
difficulties where the claimant died before the hearing.
71. R. v. Preston Supplemelliary Bet/ejit Appeals Tribunal, Ex. p. Moore [1975] I W.L.R. 624. This was,
however, an application for certiorari.
72. 3 W.P.A.R. 2055.
73. 4 W.P.A.R. 985.
74. [1946] 2 All E.R. 544. This was the only attempt to challenge one of Denning's decisions in the
Court of Appeal. The court held that it had no power to reviewhis refusal to grant leave to appeal out of
time.
75. [1946] 1 K.B. 345.
76. [1945] K.B. 490. PRO LCO 2/3711: Coldstream's memorandum, I May 1946.
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court of law.77 They believed themselves able "to take judicial notice of eJl"pert
medical opinion",78 whether it was (1) submitted by an independent medical
specialist, to whom they were authorised to refer "difficult medical questions"; 79
(2) furnished as a signed statement by a medical practitioner and properly put in by
the claimant or the Minister; (3) recited in the Minister's statement of reasons for
rejecting the claim; or (4) given by the medically qualified member of the tribunal
himself, either at the hearing or during its subsequent deliberations. Neither of the
last two sources came within Tucker J's definition of the evidence required by s.4
of the Act:
"It is, I think, of the essence of "evidence", according to English ideas, when
used with reference to judicial or quasi-judicial ideas, that it should consist of
oral statements or documents in writing which are made in the presence or
communicated to both parties before the tribunal reaches its decision ...
Information communicated by the medical member to his colleagues during
their deliberations does not fulfil these requirements and cannot, in my
opinion, be relied upon as evidence ... ,,80
The proper role of the medical member was crucial to the way in which the
tribunals operated and in Taylor v. Minister of Pensions81 the Ministry pressed the
Court of Session to pronounce on this wider issue.82 Cooper L]-C, with whom
Lords Stevenson and Patrick concurred, agreed that it would be illegitimate for
the medical member to introduce new medical "facts" without an adjournment or
a reference but held that it was in order for him to advise and instruct his
colleagues on what the accepted view was on any matter of medicine. Their
approach to the statute was more purposive than Tucker's: "it is legitimate to
infer, with the experience of the Workmen's Compensation Act in mind, that in
providing for a medical member, Parliament desired, as far as possible to prevent
cases of this type from developing into costly contests between arrays of expert
witnesses.,,83 The medical member must be more than an "animated lexicon" and
need not "keep his professional knowledge and experience locked up in his
breast.,,84 This was much more satisfactory to the Ministry, and they contended
that Denning should prefer Taylor to Moxon.8s
77. Pensions Appeal Tribunals (England and Wales) Rules 1943 (No.1757/L39), especially r.12/5;
Pari. Debs. 1942-3 (5th series) H. of c., vo1.390, co1.l209 (Attorney-General).
78. PRO LCO 2/3711: memorandum of I May 1946.
79. r.15.
80. Moxoll v.Millisler of Pensions [1945]1 K.B. 490, at p.50!.
81. [1946] S.c. 99.
82. The Court of Session's earlier decision in Brazierv. Minister ofPellsiolls [1945] S.c. 359 was made
shortly after, and in ignorance of, Moxon and took a less strict view.
83. [1946J S.c. 99, at p.108.
84. Ibid..
85. [1946] S.c. 99; [1945]1 K.B. 490.
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Denning, however, firmly supported Tucker's judgment. Even if the medical
member wanted to put his expert opinion forward as "evidence", he might not do
so since the rules precluded him from being cross-examined, which was an
essential feature of oral evidence.86Denning pronounced that "the function of the
medical member, like that of the other members, is judicial. It is not to supply
evidence, but to adjudicate on the evidence";87 and that sums up the English
judges' view of the tribunals, that they should base themselves on the judicial
model, weighing the evidence provided by the parties without supplementing it
from their own expertise.
Just how strange and unpopular this conception was with the tribunals only
becomes apparent from the response of their President and chairmen to
Denning's judgment. The chairmen memorialised the government, demanding
legislation either to permit the medical member to "give evidence" or, failing that,
to convert both him and the service member into assessors,88while the tone of
Ashby's memoranda grew positively hysterical. It is clear that both he and the
chairmen completely failed to grasp the essential changes that had been made in
the terms under which they operated and had no conception that their proceedings
could be seen as unfair to the claimant. His confident assertion that "Tribunals ...
had alwaysworked in that way quite smoothly, efficiently and justly ever since they
were first started" was too much for Coldstream, who retorted that "it seems to me
that it is impossible for the Tribunals to go on as they have been doing for the last
25 years - it was certainly not Schuster's intention that they should act now as they
acted between 1920 and 1943."89
Despite their predictions of chaos, the tribunals found that they could
accommodate themselves to the more judicial manner of proceeding which was
now required of them. There were, of course, longer delays, more adjournments
and references,90 while the Ministry of Pensions warned that their representatives
"would have to be instructed to adopt a more pugnacious attitude than in the
past,,;9I in short, proceedings would come to resemble more closely those in a
court of law. "The Lord Chancellor recognised that these results could not be
avoided, but both he and the Attorney-General did not consider them to be unduly
serious and they agreed moreover that the judgments of Denning J were probably
correct . . .".92
The "dethronement of the medical member,,93 was underlined in further
judgments which denied that he might give advice to the tribunal based on his
86. [1946] 1 K.B. 345, at p.353.
87. Ibid., at p.l07.
88. PRO LCO 2/3711: A. 8. Ashby, "Memorandum No.2", 11June 1946.
89. Ibid.; PRO LCO 2/3711: Coldstream to Ashby, 18 June 1946.
90. Predicted in Coldstream's memorandum, supra n.78. In Parliament, court rulings were given as the
reason for delays: Pari. Debs. 1946-47 (5th series) H. of c., vo1.430, cols.1398-99.
91. LCO 2/3711: minute of meeting, May 1946.
92. Ibid..
93. Colpstream's phrase, supra n.78.
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observation of the claimant at the hearing or utilise medical opinion which had not
been put before the tribunal, and in which even the inference that he might have
gone outside his judicial role was sufficient to make the decision bad.94
The tribunal, then, was to model its deliberations on those of a court, assuming
a judicial stance rather than an inquisitorial one and only seeking to interpret the
'evidence' before it. It was not limited to evidence understood by the courts, but it
is not surprising, in view of the English judges' insistence on imposing the judicial
model, that the tribunals sometimes erred in excluding material which satisfied the
"logically probative" test. 95 Denning, indeed, was anxious that they should have
before them as much material, particularly of a medical nature, as necessary, in
order to fill the gap left by eliminating the evidence-providing function of the
medical member. To this end he actively encouraged them to resort to
independent medical specialists whenever it might be useful to them or
advantageous to the claimant,96 even holding that if the claimant produced a
specialist's report more favourable to his claim than that of the IMS, the latter
should be sent a copy and given an opportunity to reconsider his own opinion.97
Likewise, both Denning and the Court of Session insisted that the Ministry's
statement, the basic record of the claimant's military service and medical history,
must be full, detailed and not selective.98 Moreover, although the rules governing
evidence might be less strict, the procedural safeguards for the claimant must be
maintained in their full rigour: he must have an opportunity to see or hear and deal
with all the evidence and to put in evidence contradicting it,99 although his failure
to provide evidence on relevant matters might legitimately form the basis for
unfavourable inferences. I In order for him to be able to deal with medical
evidence, it must, therefore, be couched in a form intelligible to a layman and not
made too cryptic or technical. 2
94. Birt v.Minister of Pensions 1W.P.A.R. 151; Forster v.Millister of Pensions 1W.P.A.R. 145; Hurst v.
Minister of PensiollS 1 W.P.A.R. 525; Heyward v.Minister of Pmsions 1 W.P.A.R. 557.
95. XY v.Minister of Pensions [1947] 1 All E.R. 38 (proceedings of military court of enquiry); Baxter v.
Minister of Pensions 1W.P.A.R. 1203 (claimant's medical certificates); DOlllwan v.Minister of Pensions 1
W.P.A.R. 609 (medical textbooks).
96. This practice was clearly in evidence byMay, 1947: see PRO LCO 2/3709: Belfray (RC]) to Sir A.
Napier 13 May 1947.
97. Harris v.Minister of Pellsions 4 W.P.A.R. 73. The IMS should see all the medical evidence from
both sides (Fitzhugh v.Minister ofPensiollS 4 W.P.A.R. 101) and the terms of the request to him should
also be made available to the parties (Houlicall v.Millister of PmsiollS 3 W.P.A.R. 1355).
98. Chairmen complained of the Ministry's selectivity and editing: PRO LCO 2/3707. The Court of
Session criticised this tendency in Findlay v.Minister of Pmsiolls [1947] S.c. 589.
99. Birt v. Millister of Pmsiolls 1 W.P.A.R. 141. In Fox v. Minister of Pens iollS I W.P.A.R. 459 a sick
claimant who had dictated her evidence at home was held entitled to have an opportunity to sec and
check thc version put before the tribunal.
1. Childs v.Minister of Pensions 1 W.P.A.R. 679;HullI v.Millister of PmsiOllS 1 W.P.A.R. 1093.
2. Thompson v.Minister ofPmsions 1W.P.A.R. 479; Salter v.Millister ofPmsions 1W.P.A.R. 1195. As
the Franks Commission recognised, there were limits to this: Cmnd 218 of 1957, para. 222.
109
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
2. The burden ofproof
Upon this material the tribunals must form their opinion, but here again it was
insisted that they must work, as the courts did, within a framework of burdens and
presumptions. The Warrant explicitly stated that "In no case shall there be an
onus on any claimant under this Our Warrant to prove the fulfilment of the
conditions [for entitlement to a pension] and the benefit of any reasonable doubt
shall be given to the claimant" (article 4(2». Moreover, by article 4(3) "where an
injury or disease which has led to a member's discharge or death during war
service was not noted in a medical report made on that member on the
commencement of his war service, a certificate [of entitlement] shall be given
unless the evidence shows that the conditions ... are not fulfilled."
Although, as Edmund Davies] later put it, "the task of interpreting article 4(2)
has been bedevilled by the presence of article 4(3)",3 judges had no doubt that
article 4 wrought a fundamental change by shifting the onus onto the Ministry to
disprove the claim. However, perhaps because the Warrant did not expressly
reverse the onus, at least some tribunal chairmen, and the Ministry of Pensions,
did not fully appreciate its significance. They were given a ride awakening in the
first reported case, lroingv. Ministry ofPensions,4 in which Cooper L]-C, speaking
obiter and without hearing argument, not only insisted that in every disputed fact
the onus must be on one party or the other, but also remarked that the phrase, 'any
reasonable doubt' seemed to place the tribunal in the position of a jury in a
criminal trial. The point was fully argued and his view approved in Mitchell,5 while
in England Tucker ] insisted on the importance of the change in onus and
approved the Scottish decisions, which interpreted "doubt" in article 4(2) as
meaning "a reasonable doubt, and not a strained or fanciful acceptance of remote
possibilities.,,6 Moxon was cited in Starr,7 where Denning considered the question
of onus in some detail. He was particularly well qualified to do so at that time,
having recently published an article entitled, "Presumptions and Burdens",8
which argued for a new classification of presumptions as "provisional",
"compelling" and "conclusive", and of burdens into "legal", "provisional" and
"ultimate" as a way out of the confusion into which he felt English judges had
fallen.
In Starr, Denning held that the Minister's function was "quasi-judicial. He may
be able to come to a determinate conclusion without reasonable doubt, but if the
evidence leaves him in reasonable doubt, then the claimant must be given the
benefit of the doubt. That means that he must not decide against the claimant on a
3. Judd v.Millisler of PensiOlISalld Naliol/allllsurallce [1965] 3 All E.R. 642, at p.648.
4. [1945] S.c. 21
5. [1946] S.c. 131.
6. Moxoll v. Mil/isler of Pmsiolls [1945] 1 K.B. 490, quoting Cooper LJ-C in lroillg v. Millister of
Pf1lsiollS [1945] S.c. 21, at p.29.
7. [1946] 1 K.B. 345.
8. (1945) 61 L.QR. 379.
110
THE USES OF POWER
mere balance of probabilities ... There must be a real preponderance of
probability against him such as to exclude reasonable doubt.,,9 He also considered
the meaning of article 4(3), which raised a "compelling presumption ... which
takes the place of evidence." The distinction between claims made with the benefit
of 4(3) and others was that "in order to defeat a claimant, in cases under article
4(2), the evidence against him must overthrow any evidence in his favour, whereas,
in cases under article 4(3), it must also overthrow the presumption in his
favour."JO Even outside article 4(3) a "provisional presumption" might arise in the
claimant's favour. In Rowingv. Minister of Pens ions I 1 Denning said that "if a man is
accepted for service in a certain medical category there is a presumption that at the
time of his acceptance he was fit for the kind of service demanded of a man in that
category; and in the event of his discharge subsequently on medical grounds due to
deterioration in his health, there is a presumption that the deterioration was due to
his service." This was wrongly interpreted in some quarters as endorsing the
slogan "fit for service, fit for pension".12
It was generally assumed, on the basis of those decisions, that the "real
preponderance of probability" test was the same as in criminal cases, but
subsequently, in Miller v. Minister of Pensions, 13 Denning appeared to resile from
that position. After expounding "with classical clarity,,14 the criminal standard
demanded in article 4(3) cases, he held that other cases "must be decided in
favour of the man unless the evidence against him reaches the same degree of
cogency as is required to discharge the burden in a civil case.,,15 This ignored the
decision in Irving,16 which was directly in point, and reduced the "real
preponderance of probabilities such as to exclude reasonable doubt" to a much
lower level. Miller was followed by Ormerod J17 and relied upon by the Ministry,
but ironically (in view of Denning's special academic interest in this area), became
his only pensions decision to be expressly departed from by a nominated judge.
Black LJ, in a Northern Ireland case, 18was able to distinguish Miller, but Edmund
Davies J, in a full and careful judgment in Judd v. Minister of Pens ions and National
Insurance,19 preferred Black's reasoning that where the draftsman incorporates a
phrase ("reasonable doubt") which is known to have a recognised legal meaning, it
should be assumed that Parliament intends it to be given that meaning; he
therefore re-established the higher standard of proof for all cases under the
9. [1946] 1 K.B. 345, at pp.350-51.
10. Ibid., at p. 351.
11. [1946] 1 All E.R. 664, at p.665.
12. Pari. Debs. 1945-6 (5th series) H. of c., vo1.421,eols.2077-82.
13. [1947] 2 All E. R. 372.
14. Per Edmund Davies J in Judd v. Minisler of Pensions and N l. [1965] 3 All E.R. 642, at p.649.
15. [1947] 2 All E.R. 372, at p.374.
16. [1945] S.c. 21.
17. Oliver v.Millisler ofPmsions 5 W.P.A.R. 153.
18. Minisler of Pensions v. Greer [1958] N.J. 156.
19. [1965] 3 All E.R. 642.
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pension warrants. It is possible that Denning's apparent change of mind on this
issue is explained by the context of Miller, which was one of the "unknown
aetiology" cases which gave the tribunals their greatest difficulty. 20
3. Unanimity in decisions
Denning's rule in Brain and Wilkes v. Ministry ofPensions,21 that a tribunal must
be unanimous in rejecting the claimant's appeal, has also attracted unfavourable
judicial comment. In Brain and Wilkes, as in three cases which had earlier been
considered together by the Court of Session, the chairman dissented from the lay
members who found against the claimant. The Court of Session clearly wished to
discourage such an outcome without feeling able to go so far as to hold it wrongful:
"without affirming that it is incompetent for a tribunal to decide by a majority, it
appears to us that, when the question is the sufficiency of evidence to discharge
such an onus, and when an express injunction has been laid upon the Tribunal to
give the claimant the benefit of any reasonable doubt, only the most powerful
considerations can justifY the medical and service members in outvoting the legal
chairman ... ".22
Denning went further. With characteristic boldness and without drawing on
precedent he sketched an elegant overview of the position. Starting from the
proposition that "the rule whereby decisions are reached according to a majority
vote is firmly established in all cases where one body alone is competent to reach a
decision", he pointed out that because of the high risk of error ("it is almost as
likely to be wrong as it is to be right"),23 the law has devised two methods of
avoiding or reducing the risk. One is to give a right of appeal (as from magistrates
to quarter sessions), the other is to require unanimity, or in default are-hearing
before a differently composed body. The latter, exemplified by jury trials, is the
one appropriate to pension tribunals, where an appeal lies only on points of law.
Because of the way judges direct juries, however, ("the commonsense way in
which the rule as to unanimity is applied")24 re-trials are very rare.
The contrast between Denning's style of judgment in Brain, and that adopted by
Lord Parker CJ in Picea Holdings v. London Rent Panet25 and by the Court of Appeal
of New Zealand in Atkinson v. Brown26 is instructive. Both took as their starting
point the old case of Grundy v. Barker (1798)27 in which Eyre CJ had found a well
established rule that in public matters majority decisions were the rule, subject to
contrary provision in the governing statute. Neither liked Denning's analogy with
the jury which, indeed, seems hardly to fit comfortably a tribunal with specialist
20. [1947] 2 All E.R. 372.
21. [1947J 1 K.8. 625.
22. Brown v.Minister oj Pensiom [1946] S.c. 471, per Cooper LJ-C at p.476.
Z:5. ll<J47J I K.B. 625, at p. 626.
24. Ibid., at p.627.
25. [1971] 2 All E.R. 805.
26. [1963] N.Z.L.R. 755.
27. 1 Bos. & P. 229.
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knowledge making findings oflaw and fact, and each distinguished Brain as "a very
special case". 28
The jury analogy, however, was taken up by Ormerod J in a way Denning can
hardly have intended. In Minister of Pensions v. Horsey29 the Ministry successfully
contended that a majority decision for the claimant must also be bad, for - as the
judge pointed out - a jury's verdict must be unanimous whichever way they find. In
Horsey, Ormerod J was unable to distinguish the two situations - either a body was
entitled to proceed by a majority or it was not - and he felt bound to follow
Denning in holding that these tribunals were not.
Reviewing tribunal decisions
1. Interpreting the roidence
Once the correct procedures for tribunals to adopt had been laid down by the
courts and the meaning of certain key phrases in the governing statute and
warrants, notably those defining "war risk injury" and "military service", had been
elucidated,30 the question at issue in most appeals was whether the tribunal had
correctly interpreted the medical evidence in the light of the burden of proof.3!
The rigorous and painstaking scrutiny of the medical opinions on appeal to the
judge became so microscopic that Ormerod J found it necessary to put in a caveat:
"Neither the medical reports nor the reasons given by the Tribunals should be
scrutinised in quite the way that pleadings might be scrutinised and dealt with as
between lawyers on the hearing of a case, but at the same time, of course, I must be
satisfied on a consideration of the whole of the documents that the questions
which ought to be considered have been considered and considered from the
proper point of view.,,32 Besides being intelligible to laymen, medical opinions
should be full and detailed;33 they should not assert as a fact the very thing the
tribunal was called upon to decide, that the disease was not caused or aggravated
by military service,34 nor merely that it was endogamous, without fully explaining
28. [1963] N.Z.L.R. 755, at pp.767, 769; [1971] 2 All E.R. 805, at p.809. Commentators therefore
view the pensions decisions as of doubtful authority: H.W.R. Wade, Admillistrative La/V 5th ed. (1982),
p.812; S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Admillistrative Action 3rd cd. (1973), p.350.
29. [1949] 2 K.B. 526.
30. Appeals involving these phrases continued to occur (see, e.g., Minister of PeIlSiOlISv. Higham [1948]
2 K.B. 153) including several involvingself-inflicted (negligent) injuries (Williams v.MinisterofPeIlsiolls
I W.P.A.R. 755, Sharpe v. Minister of Pensiolls I W.P.A.R. 909, Weidman v. Minister of Pemiolls 3
W.P.A.R. 2215) and suicides (Fuller v.Millister of Pellsions 3 W.P.A.R. 1617,Duff v.Millister of PeIlsiOIlS
[1949] S.c. 63, McCrurie v.Minister of Pensions 2 W.P.A.R. 783, Blanchflower v.Minister of Pensions 4
W.P.A.R. 887), but they form a very small proportion of reported appeals.
31. The appellant's statemen( of case had actually to be cast in the form of an assertion "that there was
no evidence on which the Tribunal could reasonably come to its conclusion, or in other words that the
conclusion drawn by the Tribunal could not be reasonably drawn from the facts before them":
Armstrong v.Minister of Pemions 3 W.P.A.R. 1449, at p.\467.
32. Rickmall v.Minister of PeIlsiOIlS4 W.P.A.R. 873, at p.886. For examples see Mi'lister of PeIlsiOIlSv.
Walten I W.P.A.R. 637 and Mepham v.Millister of Pel/siom I W.P.A.R. 515.
33. See, supra n.2.
34. Mansfield v.Minister of Pensions I W.P.A.R. 439. "Only too often a medical opinion has consisted
merely of the assertion that the disease is not attributable or aggravated by war service without any
reasons to support it": Amlstrollg v. Minister of Pel/siom 3 W.P.A.R. 1449 at pp.1467-68.
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how it arose and progressed.35 Only with this information could the tribunal do its
job properly.
The most difficult cases were those in which a claimant fell victim during or
after his military service to a disease whose aetiology was wholly unknown or
imperfectly understood, whether a physical ailment such as cancer or a mental one
such as schizophrenia. Under the old warrants, such a claimant had little hope of
persuading the Ministry or a tribunal that he was entitled to a pension, but now the
onus was on the Ministry to refute any causal connection and to the inherent
difficulty of proving a negative was added those occasioned by the removal of the
need for disability to be "directly" attributable or "materially" aggravated by
service.36
In early cases the Ministry deployed three sometimes overlapping arguments to
meet this challenge, and met with some success before tribunals which were
bemused by the unfamiliar reversal of the burden of proof and often reluctant to
give full weight to the presumptions in favour of the claimant.37 The first argument
was that where a disease of unknown aetiology occurred among civilians and
servicemen alike, there could be nothing peculiar to service conditions affecting its
onset or progress; the second was that, even where the disease had not manifested
itself before enlistment, "according to the present accepted medical views of the
disease in question, the claimant must have had a 'predisposition' or an 'inherent
constitutional tendency' to that disease",38 which was the primary cause; the third
was to concede that the disease had been aggravated by military service, but to
deny that it was attributable to it.39
In Brown40 the Court of Session launched a strong attack on these arguments
and on the Ministry's general approach. They disliked the resort to excessive
jargon and technicality, for "the nature of the tribunal selected for the purposes of
affirming or denying attributability, indicate in our view that the search is for
causation no doubt, but not in the metaphysical or scientific sense but in the wider
and more liberal sense in which 'the matter would be understood by the man in the
street applying commonsense standards'." They were concerned lest "if the
objectionable tendencies are not checked, it will soon be possible to prepare a
35. McLean v.Minister of PensiollS 1 W.P.A.R. 535.
36. This was the government's concession to the "fit for service, fit for pension" lobby: ParI. Debs.
1942-3 (5th series) H. of c., vo1.391, cols.716-22.
37. They were still being strongly criticised on this count by the Court of Sessions in several cases in
1947, notably in V. Scolt v. Mil/ister of PensiollS 1 W.P.A.R. 565; J. Scott v. Minister of PensiollS 1
W.P.A.R. 589; L. Mitchell v. Minister of Pmsiol/s 1 W.P.A.R. 597.
38. Browl/ v.Minister of Pensions [1946] S.c. 471, at p.476.
39. This was less favourable to the claimant since the degree of "aggravation" had then to be assessed
and he might later find his pension stopped on the grounds that "the aggravation had passed away", i.e.
that the increased severity of the disease or the acceleration in its progress brought about by service was
now at an end. A number of these "passed away" cases began to come before the nominated judges in
1947.
40. [1946J S.c. 471.
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schedule of diseases for which pensions can never be awarded; and this we are
convinced would be entirely contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Royal
Warrants.,,41
Denning certainly agreed that the arguments outlined above were logically
flawed. In Nuttall v. Minister of Pensions42 he had already demolished the fallacy
embodied in the argument from statistics, and in Stockwell v.Minister of Pensions43
he echoed the Scottish insistence that "a predisposition to a disease is not a
disease". The fine distinction between attributability and aggravation was more
difficult, and remained a pitfall for tribunals, but in Marshall v. Minister of
Pensions44 he produced a beautifully lucid set of guidelines to distinguish between
the two.
However, both English and Scottish judges eschewed the simplest approach,
which was several times urged upon them in argument,45 that ex hypothesi, if the
nature of a disease was not properly understood it could not be proved 'beyond
reasonable doubt' that nothing in the claimant's military history had caused or
aggravated it in his case. Edmund Davies ], reviewing the case law which had
developed, evidently felt strongly drawn to this argument46 and it is possible that
Denning's preference for the lower, civil standard of proof in cases where the
presumption in Article 4(3) did not apply owes something to his recognition of the
excessive difficulties the higher burden would have imposed on the Ministry.47
Nevertheless Denning laid down stringent tests which the Ministry had to meet
before it could discharge the burden of proof in these cases. First, there had to be
enough knowledge of the disease to enable all the factors which might cause or
aggravate it to be considered: while it remained wholly mysterious, it was
impossible to do this and the claimant must succeed.48 Second, where exogenous
factors might playa part, compelling medical evidence had to be adduced to refute
the possible effect of any event or circumstance suggested either by the claimant,
by medical opinions or in the Ministry's recital of his service history; it was not
necessary however to deal with everything to which he might have been subjected
41. Ibid., at p.476.
42. [1946] 1 K.B. 345.
43. 1W.P.A.R. 189. See also his rejection of the concept of a "latent disease" in Baird v.Minister of
Pros ions 1W.P.A.R. 169 and of the search for a "predominant cause" inHoI/om v.Minister OfPetlsions 1
W.P.A.R. 283.
44. 1W.P.A.R. 785. The concession of aggravation sometimes backfired, e.g. in Dickerson v.Minister of
Pros ions 1 W.P.A.R. 561, but in Tuxford v.Minister oj Pros ions 3 W.P.A.R. 1549, Denning would not
hold the concession against the Minister and remitted the case.
45. E.g., Saxby v. Minister of Pros ions 1 W.P.A.R. 203; Docherty and Others v. Milllster of PetlSiOllS2
W.P.A.R. 655.
46. Coe v. MinisterofPetlsions and N. I. [1966] 3 All E.R. 172, at p.175.
47. See supra.
48. E.g., DonllVan v. Mimster of Petlsions 1 W.P.A.R. 609 (Hodgkin's Disease); Killg v. Minister oj
Pros ions 1 W.P.A.R. 809 (leukaemia); Docherty arId Others v.Minister of Pros ions 2 W.P.A.R. 655.
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regardless of some positive indication of relevance.49 Third, the evidence must be
strong enough to meet whichever standard of proof the case demanded. so
2. The role of the courts
Denning's conception of the role of the nominated judge was quite remarkable
in an era which a leading authority has described as forming "the great
depression" in administrative law. It is highlighted by the contrasting approach of
the Court of Session. The Scottish judges showed greater anxiety to avoid the
pitfalls of "legalism" and to give effect to the "letter and the spirit of the royal
warrants", They seem not to have been anxious to encourage appeals or to
formulate detailed guidelines for the tribunals.
Denning was altogether more ambitious. He found, ironically, that the
consequence of imposing upon the tribunals stricter judicial definitions of
evidence, proof and procedure and insisting upon a minute scrutiny of the medical
evidence, often tended to obscure the real merits of the case. Even where this
produced a result favourable to the claimant, Denning felt that "it is unsatisfactory
that a case of this kind should depend for its determination on the narrow
construction of words in medical opinions. Cases should be determined on their
real merits."SI Neither did it ensure consistency, for since the interpretation of
evidence was still a matter for the tribunals52 differences in the quality and
up-to-dateness of the evidence before them might lead to different findings in
cases on similar facts concerning the same disease: "so far as the claimants are
concerned, the cases are identical. It would give rise to an intolerable sense of
grievance if the results varied according to the date at which the medical opinion
was given or on the phraseology in which it was worded without regard to the real
merits of the cases themselves. When the material facts are indistinguishable the
consequences should be the same.,,53
In order to achieve these goals of consistency, a more positive and creative
supervision was needed and with the co-operation of Sir Harold Parker (the legal
adviser to the Ministry, who regularly appeared before him) and the legal advisers
to the British Legion it was duly implemented and described in some detail in
Armstrong and Larkin v. Ministry of Pensions. 54
49. Cf Briggs v. Minister of Pmsions 1 W.P.A.R. 2] 1 (schizophrenia), Lightfoot v. Minister of Pmsions 3
W.P.A.R. 1303 (cerebral haemorrhage) and Freeman v. Minister ofPmsions 3 W.P.A.R. 1303 (cancer of
colon), all successfully rebutted, with Crommiev.MinisterofPemiOlls 1 W.P.A.R. 1]52 (hypertension),
Hurst v. Minister of PezlSiOlIS] W.P.A.R. 525 (rheumatism), Bridge v. Millister of Pensiom 1 W.P.A.R.
139(typhoid).
50. E.g., Parr v. Minister of Pmsions ] W.P.A.R. 511; Chapmall v. Minister of Pensions 1 W.P.A.R. 917;
Osgodby v. Minister of Pf/lsions ] W.P.A.R. 1011.
51. Walker v. Minister of Pmsiom 3 W.P.A.R. 1413, at p.1421.
52. A point he emphasised in Viner v.Millister ofPmsions 1 W.P.A.R. 997; HardJl v.Minister of Pensions
3 W.P.A.R. 1259.
53. Armstrollg v. Minister of PmsiOllS 3 W.P.A.R. 1449, at p.l467.
54. 3 W.P.A.R. 1449.
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Central to this new practice was the regular use of the power to remit cases for
reconsideration, which was to be done whenever "the Superior Court can see that
there was an error in law, but cannot say, one way or the other, whether the
ultimate conclusion was wrong.,,55He listed nine circumstances in which it would
be appropriate to remit,56and in 1948 alone he followed this course in no fewer
than five-sixths of reported appeals. In particular, it was used when the evidence
before the tribunal did not justify the conclusion which it had reached, and was
insufficient to establish the real merits of the claimant's case.
The process could also be used to promote consistency. As soon as a suitable
"typical case" involvinga common disease of unknown or doubtful aetiology arose,
the Ministry and the Legion made sure that it was appealed; Denning would remit
it for reconsideration with leave to adduce further medical evidence; the
reconsidered decision, with the fullest and most authoritative medical opinions
that could be procured, would then be brought back before the judge, who would
be able to review the decision in the light of all the evidence;57 the case would then
appear in the reports, together with a summary of the medical evidence, which
would be available to tribunals considering other cases involving the same
disease.58 Indeed, "the practice has been found so useful that when a disease of
obscure origin first comes before the Court, the parties often agree for it to be
remitted for reconsideration for the express purpose of obtaining an authoritative
decision on it, see Joyce's case.,,59 In this way, before Armstrong, "signpost"
decisions had already been reported for leukaemia, diabetes and some cancers,60
and the process became so commonplace that the editor of the reports simply
noted of one case: "This case is reported as it is the "signpost" case of Hodgkin's
Disease. ,,61
55. Ibid., at p.1466. Denning derived this power from the "necessary implication of the Statute": s.6(2)
provides that "where ... the Appellant or the Minister is dissatisfied with the decision of the Tribunal
as being erroneous in point of law, he may ... appeal therefrom ... and the decision of [the] Judge
shall be final and conclusive."
56. Where evidence has been wrongly admitted, or wrongly excluded; the tribunal misdirected itself in
law, or where there is reasonable doubt that it has directed itself properly; where its procedure has been
contrary to the rules or the requirements of practice; where there was reasonable ground for thinking
that the decision might be wrong in law, but the facts were insufficiently stated to allow the Court to
make a decision; where the parties agree to bring an "obscure origin" disease before the Court to
secure an authoritative decision; where leave is granted out of time; other cases where the parties agree
to it being remitted although there is no error in law.An earlier summary of his practice on appeals is in
Atkinson v.Minister of Prnsions 1 W.P.A.R. 981.
57. Armstrong v.Minister of Prnsions 3 W.P.A.R. 1449, at pp.1467-68.
58. Such evidence was allowed in Slone v.Minister of Pensions 1W.P.A.R. 1171 (decided in January,
1948, four months before Armstrong), and regularly thereafter.
59. Armstrorlg v. Minister of Pensions 3 W.P.A.R. 1449, at p.1468; Joyce v. Mimster of Pensions 1
W.P.A.R. 1235.
60. 3 W.P.A.R. 1449, at pp.1467-68.
61. Wallis v.MirlisterofPensiollS 4 W.P.A.R. 743. This practice was devised without reference either to
the Lord Chancellor's Office or to the President of the Tribunals. After protests by the President (Sir
Owen Beasley) it was slightlymodified, but continued to achieve the desired result: PRO LCO 2/3730.
The "signpost" practice was explained and approved by Ormerod J in 5 W.P.A.R. 47, at p.62.
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There were drawbacks to this course. One was that pending appeals to the
tribunals were delayed, sometimes badly, while the result of a "signpost" case on
their disease was awaited.62Again, tribunals had to be warned not to follow the
reported cases blindly where (as was usually the case) they held that a disease
would not usually be attributable to or aggravated by war service, but carefully to
consider any particular distinguishing facts in the instant case.63There were also
unfortunate cases in which the claimant succeeded in showing that on the evidence
before the tribunal it had wrongly decided against him only for it to be ruled that
evidence subsequently available in a "signpost" case was admissible which
justified the refusal of a pension.64
Once again, the practice of the Court of Session makes an instructive contrast.
They admitted the power to remit cases and occasionally exercised it, but when
counsel for the Ministry of Pensions sought to persuade thc court that there was a
regular practice in England of remitting a case whenever the medical evidence was
insufficient to justify the tribunal's conclusion, he was given a very rough ride.65
Lord Mackay criticised Denning's decision in one of the cases cited to him, and
declined to accept that "the group of disconnected instances from Mr Justice
Denning's court establishes any such habit or practice there", feeling that to remit
cases in which the Ministry's evidence was insufficient to make out its case would
be "apt to defeat the short purposes of the Act and Warrant".66 These criticisms
were considered by Denning in Armstront7 but he maintained, with doubtful
plausibility, that the Scottish view that for remittance to be appropriate "some
particular circumstances or failure or some peculiar needs of the general
requirements of justice, would require to be shown,,68was entirely consistent with
his own. He admitted that there was some difference in approach but, with the
support of both counsel, decided not to alter his practice to conform with
Scotland.69
62. See, e.g., Bungey v.Minister ofPensiollS 3 W.P.A.R. 1523 ("widows' claims such as these should not
be subjected to delay"), waiting on the signpost case of Ward v.Minister ofPmsions 4 W.P.A.R. 521, not
heard until July 1949, fourteen months later.
63. E.g., Rice v.MinisterofPmsions 3 W.P.A.R. 1253; Garland v.Minister ofPmsiollS 3 W.P.A.R. 1505.
Cf Ormerod J at 5 W.P.A.R. 62.
64. Clark v.Minister of PeIlSions 4 W.P.A.R. 283. Likewise, in a leukaemia case (Watson v.Mil/ister of
Pmsions [1949] S.c. 107) on all fours with their own decision in Thorson v. Minister of Pensions 2
W.P.A.R. 655, where they had held that the Ministry had failed to discharge the burden of proof, the
Court of Session ruled that evidence in the "signpost" case (Kinkaidv. Minister of Pensions [1948]W.N.
208) should be admitted at the re-hearing.
65. Bache v.Minister of Pmsions [1948] S.c. 176.
66. Ibid., at p.191.
67. 3 W.P.A.R. 1449. The Court of Session had recently repeated its views in Docherty v.Minister of
PensiOllS2 W.P.A.R. 655.
68. [1948] S.c. 176, atpp.190-91.
69. 3 W.P.A.R. 1449, at p.\470.
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Conclusion
How does Denning's work as the nominated judge fit in with recent verdicts on
his judicial career? Professor Palley asserts that "it is a schoolman's game to
analyse Denning's decisions by reference to logic and precedent, because he was
so instrumental in his approach that, if convenient, he would ignore both";7o he
was "entirely result-orientated", "a naive utilitarian" who "abhorred technicality
and believed in common sense", whose greatest contribution was the
"re-emphasis of'justice"'.71 In a well-known quotation he has himself emphasised
that "my root belief is that the proper role of the judge is to do justice to the parties
before him.'m In administrative law he is said by Professor Jowell to have
espoused an "activist model" of the judicial role which tends to the adoption of a
"purposive" interpretation of statutes,73 claiming and asserting for the courts an
"inherent jurisdiction to control all inferior tribunals, not in an appellate capacity,
but in a supervisory capacity."74 His critics75would probably not dispute these
descriptions, though they would draw different conclusions from them.
In pensions appeals, of course, he had no need to assert the inherent supervisory
jurisdiction, because the appellate one was given - and limited - by the Act. His
interpretation of that role, however, certainly conforms to the "activist" model and
went well beyond the likelyintentions of those responsible for the appeal provision.
This is apparent in his characteristically broad interpretation of a "question of
law", though that was shared by the Scottish courts. More distinctive was
Denning's robust demolition of all obstacles placed in the path of would-be
appellants to his court, whether by time limits, consents, administrative
arrangements or bargains (and most remarkably his departure from the general
principle that a later decision which casts doubt upon an earlier one affords no
grounds for an appeal).76
Even more striking is the way he fashioned the appeals system into a regular
means of imposing consistency of practice and interpretation on the tribunals.
Successive Presidents, Ashby and Beasley, and some of the chairmen, found his
encouragement of appeals and close supervision irksome.77 It is therefore ironical
that the Franks Tribunal attributed the "high degree of consistency in their
methods and decisions" to the appointment of a President.78
70. Lord Daming: The Judge and the Law, supra n.l, at p.344.
71. Ibid., at pp.253, 261, 364-65.
72. The Family Story (1981), at p.174.
73. Lord Denning: The Judge alld the Lalv, supra n.l, at pp.212-13.
74. Ibid., at p.213, quoting Denning's decision in R. v. Northumberland CompellSatioliAppeal Tribllllal,
Ex p. Shaw [1952] 1 K.B. 388.
75. E.g., P. Watchman and E. Young injustice, Lord Denning and the CO/IS/illl/ion,supra n.l, pp.157 et
seq ..
76. Supra, pp.98-102
77. See, e.g., PRO LCO 2/3730: Beasley to R. Rieu, 28 February 1949.
78. Cmnd. 218 of 1957, para. 220.
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The object of his inteJ"\lentionismwas to ensure that all claimants got "a fair
crack of the whip" and that the tribunals adhered to the Warrant, the Act, the
Rules and "the requirements of justice".79 What justice seems to have required
was that their procedures and conduct should approximate as closely as the terms
of the governing regulations allowed and their own special composition and
functions permitted to the traditional model of an English court. However,
because they were not a court, they had to be unanimous in their decisions and in
the absence of counsel had to take particular care to assist the claimant in
presenting his case and understanding his rights.8o
In pursuit of his insistence on due process, Denning was quite indifferent to any
inconvenience which it imposed on tribunals or administrators. If the Minister
made a mistake in preparing cases "he has made much trouble for himself',81 and
he must live with the consequences of thousands of wrongly decided appeals; if
majority decisions were impermissible it mattered not that the Ministry would have
to search back through two and a half years of appeals to find out instances; when
Denning insisted that appeals should lie (indirectly) even from the Special Review
Tribunals, he was unimpressed by the argument that he thereby defeated their
entire purpose. Due process was inconvenient: it made heavy demands of the
tribunal chairmen as well as the Ministry's officials, and it led to a profusion of
delays, adjournments and references. When Denning encouraged tribunals to
resort as a regular practice to independent medical specialists, when he accepted
appeals in their thousands rather than as "exceptional cases", or remitted
numerous cases for reconsideration, he knew that it would cost the Treasury more
than it had budgeted for, but felt that a worthwhile price to pay for justice.82
Moreover, in ensuring that justice was done he would have no truck with
technicalities: in one case he pronounced "We will do it anyway: I do not want to
go too much on technicalities. ,,83
It is important, however, to stress the limits of Denning's "justice" in pensions
cases. It was essentially procedural, not substantive. In marked contrast with the
cases on deserted or divorced wives,with which he was shortly to create such a stir,
he felt no need to strain statutes or make new law in order to create or amplify
rights. Of course disability pensions were a statutory creation of recent origin, but
even so there might well have been a temptation to lean consistently towards the
claimant in interpreting the legislation, for there was a widespread popular feeling
(at least during and immediately after the war) that the provision was mean and
inadequate. Moreover there was no effective curb on the nominated judge's
decisions and pensions were not a party political issue. Yet despite Professor
79. Armstroug v.Miuister of Pensious 3 W.P.A.R. 1449, at p.1466.
80. Supra, pp.108-11l, 114-116.
81. Starr, Nuttall aud Bourne v.Miuister of Peusi01IS[1946] 1 K.B. 345, at p.353.
82. PRO LeO 2/3709. The Treasury complained of the growing resort to specialists as early as May
1947: B.). Grey to Sir A. Napier, 13 May 1947.
83. Shore v.Miuister of Pmsious 3 W.P.A.R. 1867.
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Palley's judgment on Starr,84 the general tenor of Denning's judgments on the
substantive question of entitlement was not very liberal. It is true that in Ministry of
Pensions v. ChenneU85 he took a broad view of causation in defining "a war risk
injury", but his rulings on that and cognate issues closely followed the settled case
law on workmen's compensation and in one case his interpretation was narrower
than the Court of Session.86 Later, on the important question of attributability/
aggravation he declined to accept the argument that ex hypothesi the Ministry could
not disprove it in diseases of unknown aetiology whereas Edmund Davies J might
have done so; he imposed on the Ministry a lower standard of proof in cases
outside article 4(3) than that same judge did,87 and although he was vigilant to
detect fallacies in tribunals' reasoning and deficiencies in evidence, he generally
remitted such cases rather than reversing the decision,88 while even his insistence
on unanimity turned out to be a two-edged sword.
Denning showed himself aware that too great an eagerness to pounce on minor
flaws might be counter-productive: "I have noticed that sometimes the Minister
concedes aggravation in a borderline case on compassionate grounds, when he
might have refused it; and the Tribunal sometimes makes an award by stretching a
point in the man's favour when if the matter were pressed to its logical conclusion
they might be forced to say it was neither attributable to nor aggravated by war
service. So, if the dilemma were forced too far, it might work out
disadvantageously to the men.,,89
The men, evidently, were to have what the statute and Warrant entitled them to,
but no more. It seems likely that left to their own devices, some tribunals would
have given them rather less. Ashby's views on key questions were narrower than
the Ministry's own,90 and it is unlikely that many tribunals would have applied
themselves rigorously to determine whether the burden and standard of proof
demanded of the Ministry was satisfied by the evidence; rather they would have
84. [1946] K.B. 345; supra p.96, n.7.
85. [1946] K.B. 250.
86. Staynings v.Minister of Pe'lsions. In Minister of PensioIlS v. Higham [1948] 2 K.B. 153 he agreed to
prefer the Scottish decision in Ba/Jantyne v.Minister of Pensions [1947]1 All E.R. 347. This was one of
several embarrassing divergencies between the two countries. A fewweeks earlier, Denning had made
general observations on the treatment of Scottish decisions in pensions cases, since he had been told
that 'forum-shopping' had been occurring as a result of the differences: "I lay down for myself,
therefore, the rule that, where the Court of Session have felt compelled to depart from a previous
decision of this court, that it is a strong reason for my reconsidering the matter; and if on
reconsideration I am left in doubt of the correctness of my own decision, then I shall be prepared to
follow the decision of the Court of Session, at any rate in those cases when it is in favour of the man,
because he should be given the benefit of the doubt." Nevertheless Higham is the only case in which
Denning did change his own view to conform to a Scottish decision and inAnnstrong he declined to do
so.
87. Supra, pp.W8-111, 114-116.
88. Most of the remitted cases eventually \Vent against the claimant.
89. Matthews v.Minister of PensiollS 3 W.P.A.R. 1993.
90. PRO LCO 2/3702: correspondence re "war risk injury" and his decision in Saffell's appeal;
2/3718: Coldstream to Rieu, 27 November 1946 (out of time appeals).
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weighed the medical opinions in a commonsense sort of way in the light of the
medical member's advice. But Denning's idea of equal justice for all inevitably
deprived some of a pension, and the reports make clear his anxiety that although
the claimant must have the benefit of any reasonable doubt, such doubts should be
eliminated by further evidence where possible rather than actively sought out in
order to assist him.
It is instructive also to follow the impact of Denning's decisions on the
departments responsible for the pension legislation and the tribunals. The
Ministry of Pensions certainly grew dismayed by his generosity in admitting
appeals out of time and were sometimes critical of his approach,91while even the
Lord Chancellor's Office, which followed its invariable practice of defending
judges against criticism from other departments, evidently found James and Revely
unpalatable.92 Nevertheless, once it had become clear that he was not seeking
openings to admit claimants to pensions through technical imperfections in the
decision-making and appeal process, they were readily reconciled to him. The
development of the "signpost case" strategy in particular shows that there was
more co-operation than confrontation between the judge and the Ministry,
certainly more than a cursory reading of the cases reported in the general reports
might suggest. However, although experience may have modified the view that a
form of appeal which allowed a single judge to make law which was effectively
unappealable was a mistake, it may be significant that the model was not adopted
for other new tribunals set up around this time.93
Denning's achievement in pensions cases, therefore, was principally to impose
on an informal, expert tribunal, the traditional model of due process developed by
the courts of law, and to ensure by unprecedently close supervision that the
claimants received the "justice" to which they were entitled. What he did not do
was stretch and bend the law so as to favour the claimants in their fight for
pensions. There is an impressive coherence and consistency in his pensions
decisions which shines out in the poverty of English administrative law in the
1940s and deserves recognition.
91. PRO LCO 2/3714.
92. [\947] \ K.B. 767; 3 W.P.A.R. \573. PRO LCO 2/37\4: Rieu's file notes 3 July 1947; 23 July
1948.
93. PRO LCO 2/37\4: G. P. Coldstream to Sir A. Napier, 9 September \947. Cj the Lands Tribunal
Act 1949; Gas Arbitration Act 1948; Iron and Steel Act 1949; Medical Act 1950; Courts-Martial
Appeals Act 1951.
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